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Abstract This paper studies the optimal linear tax-transfer policy in an
economy where agents differ in productivity and in genetic background and
where longevity depends on health spending and genes. If agents internalize
imperfectly the impact of health spending on longevity, the utilitarian optimum
can be decentralized with type-specific lump-sum transfers and Pigouvian
taxes correcting for agents’ myopia and for their misperception of health
spending’s effects on the economy’s resources. The second-best problem is
examined under linear taxation instruments. It may be optimal to tax health
spending, especially under complementarity of genes and health spending in
the production of longevity.
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1 Introduction
Although death is as universal as birth, all humans do not, obviously, have
equal longevities. As it is shown by demographers, members of the same
cohort can have lives of varying length, some individuals living longer than
others. That empirical fact is illustrated on Fig. 1, which shows the distribution
of the age at death for Swedish women born in 1900.1 In the light of that
distribution, it appears clearly that there exist significant longevity inequalities
even within a given cohort.2
Regarding the causes of those inequalities, demographic studies stressed
that some determinants of longevity differentials are under the control of
individuals, whereas other determinants lie outside their control.
The causes of longevity differentials on which agents have some control
are generally named the behavioral determinants of longevity, on the grounds
that it is the agent, by his behavior, who affects his own health and longevity.
Behavioral determinants of longevity are numerous and consist of all aspects
of individual decisions and lifestyles affecting survival. These include, among
other things, eating (Bender et al. 1998), alcoholism (Peto et al. 1992), and
smoking (Doll and Hill 1950).3 Agents can also improve their longevity
through health-improving efforts, which take various forms, including health
spending.4 Whereas demographic studies do not generally examine the impact
of health spending on longevity differentials, a brief look at the relationship
between health spending and life expectancy across countries reveals that
there exists a positive, but declining relationship between health expenditures
and longevity prospects (see Fig. 2).5 Hence, longevity differentials are also
likely to be due to distinct levels of health spending.
On the contrary, some causes of longevity differentials lie outside any
control of individuals. Those causes can be classified in two broad groups: on
the one hand, environmental factors, which include all external determinants
of longevity on which agents, taken separately, have little control, and, on
the other hand, genetic factors, on which agents have also no control, but
which are here internal to each agent.6 Although those external factors are
1Sources: The Human Mortality Database (2009).
2Note that longevity differentials are not here due to a selective involvement in wars: Swedish
women born in 1900 did not experience any world wars.
3Note that, in the presence of addiction, whether mortality factors like obesity, alcoholism, and
drug consumption are under the control of agents or not is questionable.
4Health-improving effort can be either temporal (e.g., physical activity, see Kaplan et al. 1987),
physical (e.g., abstinence of food, see Solomon and Manson 1997), or monetary (e.g., health
services, see Poikolainen and Escola 1986).
5Data: World Health Organization Statistical Information System (2009). The sample includes 193
countries.
6Environmental factors of longevity include the quality of lands (Kjellström 1986), of waters
(Sartor and Rodia 1983), and of the air (Kinney and Ozkanyak 1991). Genetic diseases take
various forms, such as the sickle-cell disease and the familial hypercholesterolemy (favoring heart
attacks; Soliani and Lucchetti 2001).
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Fig. 1 Distribution of the age at death: Swedish female 1900 birth cohort
sometimes underestimated, a recent survey by Christensen et al. (2006) argues,
on the basis of several studies, that genetic factors account for not less than a
quarter of the variance in adult human lifespan and are thus a major source
of longevity differentials. That result was derived from the comparison of
longevity prospects of twins of the two kinds: monozygotic (sharing same
genetic background) and dizygotic (having different genetic backgrounds). As
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Fig. 2 Health spending and life expectancy, 2006
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Fig. 3 Comparison of lifetimes of monozygotic and dizygotic twins
of lifespan is much reduced among monozygotic twins, revealing the role of
genetic background as a source of longevity differentials.7
Having given some empirical clues regarding the diverse causes of longevity
differentials, it should be stressed that, from the point of view of economic
policy, whether longevity is taken as exogenous or is partly affected by agents’
decisions and lifestyles makes a significant difference.
If longevity differentials are exogenous, the task of the policy-maker con-
sists in comparing agents with different life expectancies: All things being
equal, should we compensate agents who have a shorter life or on the contrary,
should we favor those who live long and happen to consume more over their
lifetime? That question admits various answers, depending on the underly-
ing ethical postulates. For instance, classical utilitarianism, if combined with
assumptions such as additive lifetime welfare and expected utility, justifies a
redistribution from short-lived agents to long-lived agents.8
But if longevity is behavioral and can be fostered by, for instance, physical
activity, health spending, or an appropriate diet, the policy-maker cannot
design policies without facing additional issues pertaining to individual respon-
sibility and rationality. When one pays attention to responsibility, the mere
fact that agents influence their longevities tends to question redistribution. For
instance, in the hypothetical case where longevity would be chosen by agents,
it is not obvious to see why a government should redistribute across agents
according to their longevities. As far as rationality is concerned, it is obvious
that the policy-maker cannot treat similarly a well-informed, fully rational
7That picture comes from the study of Herskind et al. (1996), which relies on a sample of 2,872
Danish twin pairs born between 1870 and 1900.
8See Bommier (2005) and Bommier et al. (2007a, b) on that—somewhat controversial—corollary
of classical utilitarianism.
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choice of lifestyle and a badly informed, myopic behavior. In the latter case,
the government must correct individual myopia and induce the behavior—and
longevity—that is optimal from a lifetime perspective.
In reality, longevity differentials are neither exogenous to agents nor chosen
by agents but are of mixed nature: external and behavioral. In addition, the
difficulty to decompose longevity differentials into behavioral and external
components tends to complexify the task of the policy-maker.
The goal of this paper is to study the optimal taxation policy in an economy
where individual longevity is influenced by factors of the two kinds mentioned
above, i.e., by factors on which agents have some control and by factors
on which they have no control. For that purpose, we shall set up a two-
period model, where the probability of survival from the first to the second
period of life depends on a private monetary health effort (first-period health
expenditures) and on an exogenous characteristic of agents (e.g., genetic
background). Moreover, we shall consider a population of agents who are
heterogeneous on two dimensions affecting survival prospects: on the one
hand, their productivity, and, on the other hand, their genetic background.
In order to account for the—possibly limited—rationality of agents, we shall
assume that, when being young, agents do not fully internalize the impact
of their health investment on their life expectancy.9 Note that the reason
why some individuals do not internalize in their behavior the causal link
between financial efforts in the first period of their life and longevity can be
either ignorance or myopia. But whatever the precise reason is, this lack of
rationality legitimates the social planner into acting paternalistically. In fact,
our individuals, myopic or ignorant, will be grateful to their government to
have induced them into behaving rationally.10
Throughout this paper, our normative analysis will rely on a particular
ethical criterion: classical utilitarianism. It should be stressed that this criterion
suffers, in this particular context, from two main shortcomings. Firstly, util-
itarianism, by relying on consequentialism, can hardly do justice to intuitions
about individual responsibility. The utilitarian social planner will only consider
agents’ final positions (expressed in utilities, through individual consumptions
and longevities), but will not care about how those positions have been
achieved for some initial individual conditions (productivities and genes).
Secondly, classical utilitarianism, by merely summing agents’ utilities, is not
fully satisfactory for discussing issues of life and death, as this presupposes
that any life period with a strictly positive—even infinitely low—level of utility
9That assumption is supported by the large empirical literature on limited rationality in the context
of health-affecting behavior (see O’Donoghe and Rabbin 2000). In particular, the widespread
feeling of invulnerability of young people shown by Quadrel et al. (1993) can be regarded as some
myopia, i.e., an ignorance of the effects of one’s actions.
10Note that we are not dealing here with the idea that individuals might rationally adopt a high rate
of discount. In that case, government’s intervention is highly questionable and has been labeled
“old paternalism”.
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is worth being lived.11 Undoubtedly, those two shortcomings make classical
utilitarianism a mere benchmark case, or, at most, a starting point for the study
of optimal taxation policy under endogenous longevity.
For convenience, we shall also make here some other significant sim-
plifications. Firstly, we shall allow for only a single influence of an agent on
his health—a health expenditure—which is an obvious simplification given
the various ways by which people can influence their longevity (e.g., physical
effort, etc.). Secondly, we shall concentrate exclusively on the quantity of life—
and leave aside any qualitative concerns—so that health spending can only
affect individual welfare through its impact on longevity, but not otherwise.12
Thirdly, we concentrate here on a static economy and take the structure of
heterogeneity in genes and productivities as fixed.13
Anticipating our main results, we show that, in this first best (i.e., with full
information and full availability of policy tools), the social optimum can be
decentralized with type-specific Pigouvian taxes and redistributive lump-sum
transfers. Pigouvian taxes correct for myopia—undersaving and underinvest-
ment in health—and for the fact that agents do not perceive the impact of
health policy on revenue (as in Becker and Philipson 1998). Moreover, as a
consequence of utilitarianism, redistribution goes from high productivity to
low productivity agents and from short-lived to long-lived individuals. In the
second-best problem, where policy instruments are limited to linear taxes and
lump-sum transfers, it is shown that the optimal taxes on labor income and
health spending are affected by the sign and extent of the covariance between
individual productivity and genetic endowment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model
and characterizes the laissez-faire. The social optimum and its decentralization
are studied in Section 3. The second-best problem is analyzed in Section 4.
Section 5 concludes.
2 The model and laissez-faire
Let us consider a two-period model, where all agents live a first period (of
length normalized to 1) with certainty but enjoy a second period of life with a
11Thus, the critical utility level for continuing existence is set to zero (see Broome 2004).
12Our focus on longevity-enhancing spending has important consequences when interpreting
the results of this study. In reality, various health spending, which have little relationship with
longevity, exhibit a strong redistributive dimension, or affect the quality of life periods or
productivity. Whether such spending should be subsidized lies outside the scope of this paper,
which focuses on longevity-improving spending.
13Thus, this study complements other papers, such as Zhang et al. (2006) and Pestieau et al.
(2008), which analyze the optimal taxation policy in a dynamic framework, but without an
explicit heterogeneity in longevity-enhancing characteristics. An exception is Ponthiere (2010),
who studies lifestyle-based longevity in a dynamic model where lifestyles are transmitted vertically
or obliqually across generations.
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probability π . The economy under study involves a population of agents who
are heterogeneous in three characteristics:
• A longevity-affecting characteristic (e.g., genes), denoted by εi
• A productivity at work, denoted by wi
• A degree of rationality, denoted by αi, reflecting the agent’s knowledge of
the survival process
Note that each of those characteristics can influence individual longevity:
While the genetic background affects the survival probability directly, produc-
tivity and farsightedness can also, indirectly, affect the probability of survival,
through their impact on the private health expenditures chosen by the agent.
In this section, we shall, for simplicity, describe the laissez-faire in general
terms, i.e., by considering the decisions made by an agent of type i, who exhibits
particular characteristics εi, wi, and αi, and examine how those characteristics
affect his decisions and longevity prospects. The proportion of agents of type i
in the total population will be denoted by ni.
Assuming the expected utility hypothesis and additive lifetime welfare,
individual preferences of an agent of type i can be represented by:14
u (ci − v (li)) + αiπiu (di) (1)
where ci and di denote first- and second-period consumption, li is the first-
period labor supply, and αiπi is the perceived probability of survival. As
usual, u(.) denotes the temporal utility of consumption, with u′(.) > 0 and
u′′(.) < 0. Finally, the disutility of labor is denoted by v (li). For simplicity, v (li)
is assumed here to have a quadratic form, l2i /2.
The perceived probability of survival to the second period has the form:
αiπ(ei, εi) (2)
where αi ∈ ]0, 1] denotes the degree of rationality of the agent, that is, the
extent to which the agent internalizes the impact of health spending ei and
genes εi on the probability of survival π .15 No myopia occurs when αi equals
1, while αi tending toward 0 involves a complete ignorance of the impact of ei
and εi on survival, so that agents would not invest in their health at all, which
is a quite unrealistic case.
The actual probability of survival π depends on individual characteristic εi
and on private health spending ei. We assume πe > 0 and πee < 0. We assume
also that πε > 0. For further use, we write:
πi (ei) ≡ π (ei, εi) (3)
14This expression presupposes no pure time preferences, as well as a utility from being dead
normalized to zero.
15Note that this formalization of myopia is formally equivalent to assuming some pessimism of
agents, in the sense that, under α < 1, the perceived probability of survival is always inferior to the
actual probability. While this constitutes a simplification, that modeling of myopia has the virtue
of analytical conveniency.
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As the benchmark situation, we will assume both complementarity between
health spending and genetics—so that the sign of the cross derivative πeε is
positive—and a positive correlation between genes and productivities.16
We now turn to the laissez-faire solution in an economy without govern-
ment. We assume that individuals invest all their savings on a perfect annuity
market, which yields an actuarially fair return for each risk class.17 An agent
with type i chooses his optimal level of savings si as well as his optimal level of
health spending ei by solving the following problem:
max u
(
ci − l2i /2
) + αiπi (ei) u (di)
s.t.
{
ci = wili − si − ei
di = si Ri
where Ri is the return of savings. First-order conditions yield
li = wi (4)
u′ (xi) = u′ (di) Riαiπi (ei) (5)
u′ (xi) = αiπ ′i (ei) u (di) (6)
where xi = ci − v (li) denotes the value of net consumption in period 1. We
assume that the market for annuities is actuarially fair, so that
Ri = 1
πi (ei)
where the interest rate is assumed to be zero for simplicity. Note that the return
of the annuity depends on the true survival of the individual.
As shown by expression 4, labor supply decisions are here independent from
survival prospects: Due to the quasilinearity of utility, there is no income effect
at work for the choice of labor, so that agents’ labor supply does not depend
on what their survival prospects are.
Condition 5 defines the preferred level of savings. If the agent is perfectly
rational, αi = 1, and consumption is smoothed (i.e., xi = di); on the contrary,
for any αi < 1, first-period consumption is preferred, as the individual under-
estimates his probability of survival. Note that we focus here on the interior
solution, that is, on the case where agents choose, despite their myopia, a
strictly positive level of savings (and of health expenditure). This solution holds
for reasonably low levels of myopia (i.e., sufficiently large levels of αi). On the
contrary, under a large myopia or under a full myopia (i.e., αi = 0), the first-
order condition with respect to si would be negative and there would be no
interior solution for optimal savings (i.e., si = 0).
16We will discuss the implications of those assumptions throughout this paper.
17The assumption of a perfect annuity market, which is rather strong, is made here for analytical
convenience. Actually, this study would like to abstract from tractability difficulties raised by
accidental bequests, which are examined by Cremer et al. (2007). Assuming a perfect annuity
market for each risk class is one way to avoid those difficulties. Another way consists in assuming
that the government taxes entirely the savings of the dead (see Section 4).
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Equation 6 determines the optimal level of health investment. Note that
if αi tends toward 0, the agent does not invest in health and ei tends toward 0.
Moreover, in the laissez-faire, the agent takes the return of the annuity as given
and does not internalize the impact of health spending on the annuity return.
As a consequence, the laissez-faire level of health spending will be shown to
be higher than the optimal one. This imperfection was firstly highlighted by
Becker and Philipson (1998). When choosing their health spending, agents face
a free rider problem in the sense that each agent chooses his health investment
without taking into account that this reduces the annuity price. This leads to an
excessive level of health spending.
3 Optimum and decentralization
Let us now characterize the social optimum in the economy under study.
For that purpose, we shall assume that the social planner is a standard
classical utilitarian planner (i.e., a Benthamite planner), whose goal is the
mere maximization of the sum of individual utilities. As this is well known
among normative philosophers, utilitarianism, by relying on the consequential-
ist postulate, constitutes an ethical basis that leaves aside issues of individual
responsibility.18 Moreover, the classical form of utilitarianism exhibits various
limitations in the context of endogenous longevity (see Broome 2004).19
Hence, classical utilitarianism is used here as a mere benchmark case.
Throughout this section, it is assumed that the planner perfectly observes
individuals’ type. We also adopt a “paternalistic approach” in the sense that
the social planner corrects individuals self-control problems. In the following,
we first study the centralized optimum and then how to implement it through
a tax-and-transfer scheme.
3.1 Centralized solution
We assume that a paternalistic government would like to correct for individ-
uals’ myopia. Thus, the paternalistic government takes αi = 1 in its objective
18A concern for responsibility implies that one pays attention, to some extent, to the relation
between the initial conditions in which agents are and their final positions. Here, the social planner
has, as a unique objective, the maximization of the sum of utilities (which, under welfarism,
are the unique relevant pieces of information for positions). That maximization problem is only
constrained by survival functions and utility functions and, thus, does not pay a specific attention
to how conditions and positions are related.
19The difficulties raised by varying longevity include, among other things, the definition of a critical
utility level for continuing existence, making the addition of a new life-period yielding that utility
level neutral. In the following, we rely on classical utilitarianism, where that critical level is fixed
to zero.
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ci − l2i /2
) + πi (ei) u (di)
)
subject to the resource constraint of the economy
∑
ni (ci + ei + πi (ei) di − wili) ≤ 0 (7)
First-order conditions for this problem can be rearranged so that
li = wi (8)
u′(xi) = u′(di) = μ (9)
π ′i (ei) u(di) = μ
[
1 + diπ ′i (ei)
]
(10)
where μ is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the resource constraint. First-
order condition on labor (Eq. 8) results from the assumption of quadratic
disutility of labor. Condition 9 indicates that consumption should be smoothed
between periods and across individuals, i.e., xi = di = d. This is a direct
implication of both utilitarianism and of additivity across periods in individual
lifetime utility.
We now rewrite condition 10 as
π ′i (ei) =
F
1 − dF
where F = u′ (d) /u (d) ∀i is a measure of risk aversion, called the “fear
of ruin” (see Eeckhoudt and Pestieau 2008). This function F measures the
concavity of the utility of consumption, and it is generally assumed that dF
is lower than 1. Comparing it with its laissez-faire counterpart, Eq. 6, where
π ′i (ei) = F/αi, this condition differs on two grounds. For ease of exposure, let
us first assume that αi = 1; in that case, the first-best FOC differs from the
laissez-faire FOC (Eq. 6) by a factor 1/1 − dF > 1, which can be related to
the impact of health spending on the budget set. This is the “Becker–Philipson
effect”: As opposed to the laissez-faire, the social planner takes into account
that increasing health spending decreases consumption possibilities, so that the
first-best level of health spending is always lower than the laissez-faire one.
Thus, this first effect tends to lower the first-best level of ei with respect to the
laissez-faire. Yet, this first-best expression also differs from the laissez-faire
by 1/αi. In the first best, the impact of health spending on survival is fully
internalized. This contributes to make the first-best health spending exceed
its laissez-faire level. Since both effects (Becker–Philipson and myopia) go in
opposite directions, whether the first-best level of health spending is superior
or inferior to the laissez-faire one is not clear.
Note that, in the first best, health spending is differentiated across agents
according to genetic backgrounds, εi, but not with respect to the degree of
rationality of agents, αi. Assuming, in a paternalistic way, that αi = 1 for every
type leads the social planner to redistribute only according to agents’ genetic
background and productivity (for which agents are not responsible).
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The differentiated treatment of agents in terms of health spending due to
the differences in genetic background takes a form that depends on whether
genes and health spending are complements or substitutes in the survival
function. Under complementarity, the agents advantaged by nature receive
more health spending: Making use of π ′i (ei) = F/1 − dF, one obtains that
e1 < e2 whenever ε1 < ε2. On the contrary, under substitutability between
health spending and genes, one would obtain the opposite result (i.e., e1 > e2
whenever ε1 < ε2). Finally, we would have an equality of health spending
under no genetic differences (i.e., ε1 = ε2). Thus the existence of differences
in genetic backgrounds plays a crucial role, together with the assumptions on
the survival function, as determinants of the social optimum. Our results are
summarized in the proposition below.
Proposition 1 Assume two types of individuals with productivity and genetic
characteristic (wi, εi). In the benchmark situation where w1 < w2 and ε1 < ε2
and where ei and εi are complements, the f irst-best allocation implies:
(a) xi = di = d; i = 1, 2
(b) l1 = w1 < l2 = w2
(c) e1 < e2
Before studying how that social optimum can be decentralized, it should be
stressed here that the optimum characterized in Proposition 1 reflects the two
central features of classical utilitarianism mentioned above.
First, the consequentialist nature of utilitarianism: The social planner cares
here only about the outcomes and not about the means by which these are
reached. This has the corollary that the utilitarian planning problem can
hardly do justice to intuitions about individual responsibility, which require
to investigate how means and ends are related. For instance, one may require
that, given that agents are not responsible for genetic differentials, agents with
an equal productivity should be treated equally. But this is not the case at
all under utilitarianism, as we still have e1 < e2 even under w1 = w2. Thus,
given that the social planner does not look at the problem in terms of relation
between the initial conditions and the final positions of agents, little attention
can be paid to responsibility.
Second, the above optimum, derived from classical utilitarianism, presup-
poses that the critical utility level for continuing existence is zero, so that any
life period with a strictly positive utility level is worth being lived, whatever
the utility assigned to it is. That assumption is far from neutral as far as the
definition of the social optimum is concerned. To see this, let us suppose that
only a life period with a utility level higher than a critical level u¯ is worth being
lived. Suppose now that the agents under study have an especially low level
of productivity wi, so that the utility of each period of life is below the critical
level u¯. Then, in that case, it is socially optimal to have no health spending:
e1 = e2 = 0, in order to avoid the (welfare-reducing) survival of agents to
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the second period. Hence, the assumption u¯ = 0 under classical utilitarianism
allows us to avoid such a corner solution.
Those remarks suggest that the classical utilitarian social optimum relies on
some simplifying assumptions, which do not allow us to do justice to intuitions
about responsibility or about a life period “not worth being lived”. However,
we shall, for simplicity, focus, in the rest of the paper, on the social optimum
as described in Proposition 1.
3.2 Decentralization
Let us now consider how the paternalistic optimum can be decentralized. In
the following, we assume that the set of instruments available to the social
planner includes proportional taxes on earnings, τi, on health spending, θi, and
on savings, σi, as well as lump-sum transfers Ti. The annuity market is still
assumed to be actuarially fair: Ri = 1/πi (ei) at the equilibrium.
The agent’s problem is thus to maximize:
u
(
wi (1 − τi) li − si (1 + σi) − ei (1 + θi) + Ti − l2i /2
) + αiπi (ei) u (Risi)
The first-order conditions of that problem are:
li = wi (1 − τi) (11)
αiu′ (di)
u′ (ci)
= 1 + σi (12)
u′ (ci) (1 + θi) = αiπ ′i (ei) u (di) (13)
Comparing these FOCs with the first-best FOCs, Eqs. 8, 9, and 10, we can
calculate the values of our tax instruments.
Let first assume that αi = 1. We have:
τi = σi = 0
θi = θ = dF1 − dF > 0
If individuals are myopic, αi < 1, so that we keep τi = 0, but now
σi = αi − 1 < 0
θi = αi − 1 + dF1 − dF ≶ 0
Thus, under a myopia differing across agents, the decentralization of the
social optimum requires individualized Pigouvian subsidies σi on savings and
individualized Pigouvian taxes or subsidies θi on health spending.
The intuition behind those results is the following: Regarding the sign of
σi, the justification for a subsidy on savings is straightforward: Since myopic
agents do not save enough in the laissez-faire, it is optimal to subsidize their
savings (αi − 1 < 0), in order to encourage savings and to correct for the effect
of myopia. Note also that, if agents were all identically myopic (i.e., αi = α < 1
∀i), the subsidy on savings would be equal for all agents (i.e., σi = σ ∀i).
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Concerning the sign of θi, it is straightforward to see that if αi = 1 (no
myopia), θi = θ is strictly positive, so that health spending is taxed uniformly
across all agents. This is simply due to the correction of the Becker–Philipson
effect: In order to reduce agents’ health investment toward its optimal level,
one has to tax health expenditures. On the contrary, in the presence of some
myopia (i.e., if αi < 1), the optimal tax on health may turn into a subsidy, which
is type specific (as this depends on αi). There exist two countervailing effects:
On the one hand, a tax would be necessary to correct for the “free rider”
problem, but, on the other hand, one needs a subsidy to correct for individual
myopia. Depending on the strength of the two effects, the individualized tax
on health spending θi is positive or negative.20
Regarding lump-sum transfers Ti, let us first study the direction of transfers
in the benchmark case where productivities and genetic backgrounds are
positively correlated and where health spending and genes are complementary
inputs in the production of longevity. Thus, under those assumptions, we have
two (equal-sized) groups of agents, denoted by 1 and 2, whose characteristics
are positively correlated, w1 < w2 and ε1 < ε2, and a complementarity between
εi and ei in the production of longevity πi ∀i = 1, 2.
In that case, the net transfer can be expressed as
Ti − θiei = ci + πi (ei) di + ei − wili
that is, total spending minus earning. We know that d1 = d2 = d and that c1 −
w21/2 = c2 − w22/2 = d.
Hence,




+ πi (ei) d + ei − w2i




Thus, in the benchmark case, the direction of transfers is ambiguous. However,
if the wage gap is very small (large) with respect to the genetic gap, one has
T2 − θ2e2 > (resp. <) T1 − θ1e1.
Note that, if, instead of complementarity, we had substitutability of genes
εi and health spending ei, we would also have an ambiguous sign of transfers,
depending, among other things, on the shape of the survival function πi (ei).
In sum, the direction of transfers (whether an agent is net beneficiary or net
recipient) cannot be identified analytically.
4 The linear tax problem
Having characterized the social optimum and its decentralization under a full
set of policy instruments, let us now consider the problem of a social planner
20Note also that if αi = α < 1 ∀i, it would follow that θi = θ ∀i.
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who has only a limited set of policy instruments available. As above, the
planner faces a society of agents with different genetic characteristics εi and
different productivities wi. However, for simplicity, all agents are assumed,
throughout this section, to be equally myopic (αi = α > 0).
The second-best framework studied here is characterized by the restricted
availability of policy instruments. We assume away individualized transfers
or taxes and we posit that there is no way in which saving can be taxed.
Specifically, our set of instruments will here include constant tax rates on
earnings τ and (private) health expenditure θ , a first-period lump-sum transfer
T (i.e., a demogrant), and a flat rate pension benefit, P.
Furthermore, in order to be closer to reality—where annuity markets
remain, for various reasons, underdeveloped—we shall assume here that there
exists no annuity market.21 As this is well-known, the nonexistence of annuities
imply accidental bequests. For simplicity, it is assumed that those bequests are
taxed at a 100% rate.22
Hence, the budget constraint of the government can be written as:
∑




τwili + (1 − πi (ei)) si + θei
]
(14)
Having introduced the components of our model, the problem faced by an
agent of type i is the following: In the first period, the agent works, invests
in health, and saves for the second period.23 Then, in the second period, if
still alive, the agent consumes his savings and the pension benefit. Thus, the





ci − l2i /2
) + απi (ei) u (di)
s.to
{
ci + si + ei (1 + θ)  wili (1 − τ) + T
di ≤ si + P
We suppose a zero interest rate. If there is no liquidity constraint, the optimal-
ity conditions are
u′ (xi) = απi (ei) u′ (di) (15)
li = wi (1 − τ) (16)
(1 + θ) u′ (xi) = απ ′i (ei) u (di) (17)
21Equivalently, we assume that Ri = 1 ∀i. The absence of an annuity market consists of another
major second best feature of the framework studied in this section.
22A rate below 100% would complicate the analysis significantly, as some agents would benefit
from unintended bequests. This would be, to some extent, close to the assumption of imperfect
annuity markets, discussed in Cremer et al. (2007). For simplicity, we shall abstract here from
those difficulties by assuming full taxation of the saving of dead agents.
23It is also assumed, for simplicity, that agents cannot borrow with public pensions as collateral.
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Expressions 15 and 17 determine the optimal levels of savings si and of health
expenditures ei chosen by an agent of type i.24 Note that for any α ∈ ]0, 1[, the
levels of health expenditures and of savings are lower than if the agent was
not myopic (i.e., α = 1). Replacing the optimal level of health spending e∗i and
savings s∗i , agent i’s utility function can be rewritten as:
u
(
w2i (1 − τ)2
2










As mentioned above, the social planner is assumed to be of a utilitarian—
but paternalistic—type. Paternalism is justified so as to correct agents’ self-
control problem, i.e., agents’ myopia.









w2i (1 − τ)2
2










+ μ [(1 − π (e∗i
))







where μ is the multiplier associated with the budget constraint and the variable
s∗i and e
∗
i are functions of policy tools through Eqs. 15–17.
Differentiating this expression and substituting for the FOCs pertaining to
optimal savings and optimal health expenditures yield:
∂£
∂τ
















[(−π ′ (e∗) (s∗ + P) + θ) ∂e
∗
∂τ























[(−π ′ (e∗) (s∗ + P) + θ) ∂e
∗
∂θ





24Here again, we assume, for simplicity, that an interior solution exists. See Andersen and
Bhattacharya (2008) on the savings of myopic agents under a PAYG system.
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(−π ′ (e∗) (s∗ + P) + θ) ∂e
∗
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where we used the expectation operator E(.) to simplify notations. Throughout
this paper, we consider interior solutions only, so that the above expressions
are all set equal to zero.
Those optimality conditions allow us to characterize the optimal values of
our policy tools τ, θ , T, and P. Note, however, that the simultaneous study of
the optimal levels of the four taxation instruments would be quite laborious, as
their values are all related to each others through the government’s budget
constraint. Hence, to keep the analysis simple, we shall proceed in three
successive stages. Given that the transfers T and P are closely related, it makes
sense, for conveniency, to study those policy instruments separately and thus
consider first the optimal values of the two pairs of instruments (τ, T) and
(τ, P). Then in a third stage, we shall study the optimal tax transfer θ on health
spending.
4.1 Payroll taxation compensated by first-period demogrant
Regarding the definition of the optimal payroll tax τ , it should be stressed
that the FOC (Eq. 18) of the previous section does not allow us, on its
own, to characterize the optimal level of τ , as a rise in τ must necessarily,
under the government’s budget constraint, imply a change in some other fiscal
instruments, so that other FOCs must be considered too. In this subsection,
we shall assume, as a starting point, that payroll taxation funds a first-period
uniform benefit T and derive the optimal level of τ under that assumption.25
In order to characterize the optimal level of the payroll tax rate τ on
the basis of the conditions derived in the previous section, we will use here
a compensated Lagrangian expression, whose derivative with respect to the
policy instrument τ gives us the effect of a variation of τ on the Lagrangian
when that change is compensated by a variation of the demogrant T that keeps
the aggregate households’ budget constraint unchanged.
25To simplify the presentation, we shall assume, in this section that θ = P = 0, so that changes in
τ affect the demogrant T only.
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Using the preceding first-order conditions 18 and 20 and reminding that, in










where £˜ denotes the compensated Lagrangian and where ∂T/∂τ = (1 − τ) Ew2
is computed from the aggregate households’ budget constraint.26 This ap-
proach is quite standard in public economics; it allows us to obtain tax formulas
in terms of compensated tax derivatives in the Ramsey tradition.27 Substituting
for the different terms, the above condition can be rewritten as28
∂ £˜
∂τ
= −cov (u′ (x) , w2) (1 − τ) − τ Eu′ (x) Ew2
+ (1 − α)
[
Eπ (e) u′ (d)
∂ s˜
∂τ






(−π ′ (e) s) ∂ e˜
∂τ




where ∂ s˜/∂τ = ∂s/∂τ + ∂s/∂T × (1 − τ) Ew2 and ∂ e˜/∂τ = ∂e/∂τ + ∂e/∂T ×
(1 − τ) Ew2 are the compensated tax derivatives of s and e. Note that we use
here the concept of average compensation and not that of the standard Slutsky
term, as the latter includes the individual and not the aggregate compensation.
Denoting the real substitution effect by a superscript ^, we write the standard
















The two concepts differ for individuals with extreme (low or high) rates of
wage. Solving the above equality, ∂ £˜/∂τ = 0, yields:29
τ
1 − τ =
−cov (u′ (x) , w2) + 1−α1−τ
[
Eπ (e) u′ (d) ∂ s˜
∂τ






(−π ′ (e) s) ∂ e˜
∂τ





26Total differentiation of the aggregate households’ budget constraint (1−τ)
2 Ew2
2 + T = 0 leads to
(1 − τ) Ew2dτ = dT.
27On that technique, see Cremer et al. (2008). There are other ways to combine the first-order
conditions. One way allows to get rid of the multiplier μ, but the expression obtained by following
that alternative approach would have a more difficult interpretation.
28For conveniency, we shall here delete the * superscripts, but we remain at the optimum.
29Note that τ appears both on the LHS and on the RHS of expression 22, so that Eq. 22 consists
merely of an implicit definition of the optimal τ . Moreover, the LHS is increasing in τ .
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Note that if α = 1 (individuals are perfectly rational), that expression collapses
to:
τ
1 − τ =
−cov (u′ (x) , w2) − μ1−τ E
(




+ μ1−τ E (1 − π (e)) ∂ s˜∂τ
μEw2
(23)
The denominator of Eq. 23 is the standard efficiency term. It depends on
the derivative of labor supply with respect to the tax. With a quadratic labor
disutility and a quasilinear utility function, the derivative of the labor supply
with respect to τ is −w2i (1 − τ).
The first term in the numerator is the standard equity term and is positive
since cov
(
u′ (x) ;w2) is negative (as the level of earnings and the marginal
utility of first-period consumption are negatively correlated). If u (x) were
linear, there would be no redistributive objective and this term would cancel
out.
The second term represents the negative effect of living longer on the
government’s revenue. A higher health spending decreases the number of
accidental bequests (which we assumed to be taxed at 100%). This effect
coincides with the effect that was first highlighted by Becker and Philipson
(1998). If the payroll tax combined with a lump-sum transfer leads to more
health expenditures (∂ e˜/∂τ > 0), then this tax should, in the presence of the
Becker–Philipson effect, be lower than in the absence of such an effect.
The third term is the effect of the tax-transfer policy on the size of savings
and, thus, on the revenue generated by accidental bequests. If ∂ s˜/∂τ < 0 (as we
expect), the optimal tax τ should be lower under the presence of the taxation
of unintended bequests than in the absence of it (π (e) = 1).
To sum up, assuming that ∂ s˜/∂τ < 0 and ∂ e˜/∂τ > 0, our redistributive
payroll tax will be depressed by its negative revenue effect on both the number
and the size of accidental bequests (i.e., (1 − π (ei)) s).
Let us now consider the general expression 22, where the degree of ra-
tionality α differs from 1. This equation shows that having myopic agents in
this framework has nontrivial consequences on the level of the optimal tax
rate. Actually, with α < 1, there are now two additional Pigouvian terms in
the numerator, aimed at correcting agents’ myopia. Remind that an imperfect
rationality makes agents underinvest in their health and undersave. Hence,
if a rise in income taxation compensated by a higher T makes people save
even less (i.e., ∂ s˜/∂τ < 0), this does not play in favor of a larger tax rate, as
this would reinforce undersaving. However, if a rise in income taxation makes
agents spend more on health (i.e., ∂ e˜/∂τ > 0), this contributes to correct the
underinvestment in health. Given that ∂ s˜/∂τ < 0 calls for a lower tax and
∂ e˜/∂τ > 0 for a higher tax, the overall sign of that additional term is unknown
and depends on the absolute values of ∂ s˜/∂τ and ∂ e˜/∂τ , as well as on the
marginal utility gains from correcting the two effects of myopia: πi (ei) u′ (di)
versus π ′i (ei) u (di).
In interpreting our formulae, we make here assumptions concerning the sign
of compensated elasticities: ∂ s˜/∂τ < 0 and ∂ e˜/∂τ > 0. It should be stressed
here that those assumptions should be merely regarded as a priori plausible
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postulates. We would definitely need more information about utility functions
to check how realistic they are. Moreover, whether payroll taxation finances
T or P is likely to matter for the signs of those compensated elasticities. For
instance, when a payroll tax finances pension benefits P, it is expected to have
a depressive effect on saving (see infra). On the contrary, when it finances first-
period benefit T (as it is the case here), things are less clear, so that ∂ s˜/∂τ < 0
is a stronger assumption in that context.
Finally, it should also be reminded, when interpreting those results, that
we use here a particular definition of compensation that departs from the
standard definition of Slutsky effects. The compensation is here aggregate and
not individual (see above). This also should incite one to caution in interpreting
our compensated elasticities.
4.2 Income taxation compensated by a Beveridgian pension
We now do the same exercise as above, but assume that the variation of
τ is compensated by a variation in the pension benefit P. Combining the







(1 − τ) Ew
2
π¯
where π¯ ≡ Eπ (e) is the average survival probability of the population. The
last term, (1 − τ) Ew2/π¯ , gives the variation of P following the variation of τ
so as to keep the aggregate households’ budget constraint unchanged. Thus,
the optimal value for the tax rate can be expressed as
τ








Eπ (e) u′ (d) ∂ s˜
∂τ







(−π ′ (e) (s + P)) ∂ e˜
∂τ








where ∂ s˜/∂τ = ∂s/∂τ + ∂s/∂ P × dP/dτ and ∂ e˜/∂τ = ∂e/∂τ + ∂e/∂ P × dP/dτ
denote the compensated derivatives of savings and health spending.31
Under no myopia (α = 1), we have:
τ
1 − τ =





(−π ′ (e) (s + P)) ∂ e˜
∂τ






When interpreting that formula, we shall assume, as above, that ∂ e˜/∂τ > 0
and ∂ s˜/∂τ < 0. Note, however, that the latter assumption is here much more
natural than it was in the previous subsection. Actually, although a rise in τ
30We now assume that θ = T = 0.
31Note that here again, these are not real substitution effects, as we consider aggregate
compensation.
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compensated by a rise of the demogrant T has an ambiguous effect on savings,
a rise in τ compensated by a rise in the pension P is most likely to reduce
savings.
In comparison with Eq. 23, that is with the case of payroll taxation financing
a uniform first-period benefit, there is here in Eq. 25 an additional term, which
is the second term of the numerator. This term increases as π¯ decreases, that
is, as more private savings is ‘wasted’ as accidental bequests. It reflects the fact
that the collective annuitization implicit in the pension scheme is much more
attractive with a low π¯ than with a high π¯ . Clearly, it represents an additional
argument in favor of a positive τ .
Under the presence of myopia, there are two additional terms in the
numerator of Eq. 24, which, as above, are of Pigouvian nature and aim at
correcting agents’ tendency to undersave and underinvest in health because
of their myopia. Note that the term related to collective annuitization is also
influenced negatively by α. Myopia and low survival probability have here the
same effect: They both make collective annuitization more desirable.
4.3 Taxing or subsidizing longevity
Using the same approach as in the previous subsections, we now consider the
optimal level of health taxation θ along with the first-period demogrant T.32









where, as before, ∂ £˜/∂θ is the derivative of the compensated Lagrangian with
respect to θ . This is equal to the sum of the derivative of the Lagrangian
with respect to θ plus the derivative of the Lagrangian with respect to the
demogrant T, i.e., ∂£/∂T, multiplied by the variation of the demogrant induced
by the change of θ , i.e., dT/dθ = e¯, in order to keep the aggregate households’
budget constraint unchanged.33
It can be shown that the optimal tax on health expenditures has the
following form:
θ =
[−cov (u′ (x) , e) + (1 − α) E [π (e) u′ (d) ∂ s˜
∂θ
+ π ′ (e) u (d) ∂ e˜
∂θ
]
−μE (π ′ (e) s) ∂ e˜
∂θ






where ∂ s˜/∂θ = ∂s/∂θ + ∂s/∂T × dT/dθ and ∂ e˜/∂θ = ∂e/∂θ + ∂e/∂T × dT/dθ
are the compensated tax derivatives of s and e with respect to θ .
32For the ease of presentation, we now assume here that τ = P = 0.
33The term e¯ denotes the average level of health spending in the population.
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In the case where α = 1, that expression collapses to:
θ = −cov
(
u′ (x) , e
) − μE (π ′ (e) s) ∂ e˜
∂θ





Let us first interpret expression 27, which concerns the case where agents are
perfectly rational. To make the interpretation easy, we shall assume here that
taxing health spendings reduce those spendings (i.e., ∂ e˜/∂θ < 0), but favors
savings (i.e., ∂ s˜/∂θ > 0), which is quite plausible.
The denominator reflects the efficiency concerns and is positive when
∂ e˜/∂θ < 0. In the numerator, the second and third terms are positive and
represent the impact of taxing health on government revenue through its
impact on savings and on health spending. As in the preceding subsection,
taxing health spending increases the number of accidental bequests (second
term); the last term represents the gain in revenue due to the increase in the
size of accidental bequests. However, the covariance cov
(
u′ (x) , e
)
, which rep-
resents the redistributive objective, has an unclear sign. If cov
(
u′ (x) , e
)
< 0,
it follows that θ > 0, so that the agent faces a tax; but if cov
(
u′ (x) , e
)
> 0,
θ ≶ 0, and it might happen that agents benefit from a subsidy on health.
The sign of cov
(
u′ (x) , e
)
depends on the correlation between w and ε
and on the functional relation between e and ε in π (e, ε). In the benchmark
situation where w and ε are positively correlated and e and ε are complements,
we expect the covariance cov
(
u′ (x) , e
)
to be negative: More productive agents
will spend more on health, so that u′(x) and e are negatively correlated.
Alternatively, if we allow e and ε to be substitutes, it is possible, if π(e, ε)
exhibits decreasing returns to scale, that a higher ε makes more productive
agents choose a lower health spending e, so that e is here negatively correlated
to w, implying that the covariance cov
(
u′ (x) , e
)
is positive.34
Turning now to the general formula with α < 1, there are two additional
Pigouvian terms, which, if ∂ e˜/∂θ < 0 and ∂ s˜/∂θ > 0, play in opposite direc-
tions. If taxing health spending enhances savings, ∂ s˜/∂θ > 0, then the presence
of myopia leading to undersaving is an additional motive for taxing health
expenditures. On the contrary, if taxing health spending reduces these (i.e.,
∂ e˜/∂θ < 0), then such a tax would not correct at all the myopia but reinforce it.
Hence, the overall impact of myopia on the optimal level of the tax on health
spending is ambiguous.
To sum up, let us compare the tax on earnings with the tax on health
expenditures under the assumptions: cov
(
u′ (x) , w2
)
< 0, ∂ s˜/∂τ < 0, ∂ e˜/∂τ >
0, ∂ s˜/∂θ > 0, and ∂ e˜/∂θ < 0 and under cov
(
u′ (x) , e
)
≷ 0. If all agents are
identical, that is, if there is no redistributive concern, we expect a tax on health
and a subsidy on earnings. However, as soon as agents differ, we reintroduce
34Take the case of two agents 1 and 2 with w2 > w1 > 0 and ε2 > ε1 = 0, and assume π (εi + ei).
Assume further that π1 (0) = 0, π ′1 (0) = ∞, π2(ε2) = 1, π ′2(ε2) = 0. One expects e1 > 0 and e2 = 0.
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the covariance terms, and, in the benchmark situation, we get positive taxes on
earnings and on health.35
Note that substitutability between genetics and health spending is impor-
tant, but the relative weight of these two factors in the production of π matters
also. To see that, let us take two extreme examples: πe = 0 and πε = 0. In the
first case, π is exogenous but differs across agents. Hence, in that case, e = 0,
and tax policy is restricted to redistribution and to saving promotion. In the
second case, where genetics plays no role, most results obtained above remain
true, but it becomes impossible for the cov
(




The goal of this paper was to study the optimal tax-transfer policy in an econ-
omy where longevity depends on individual behavior when being young and on
an exogenous characteristic (e.g., genetic background). For that purpose, we
considered a two-period model, where the population differs in productivity
and genes and where the probability of survival to the second period depends
on first-period health spending and on inherited genes.
We showed that, under Benthamite utilitarianism, the social optimum can
be decentralized by means of redistributive lump-sum transfers and Pigouvian
taxes correcting for agents’ myopia—undersaving and underinvestment in
health—and for their incapacity to perceive the effect of health spending on
the resource constraint.
The second-best problem was studied in three stages. In a first stage devoted
to an optimal income tax financing a first-period lump-sum transfer, it was
shown that the redistributive motive supporting income taxation tends to be
mitigated by its negative revenue effect on the amount of accidental bequests.
Moreover, myopia has here an ambiguous effect on the optimal tax level, as a
rise in income tax may well raise the (too low) health expenditures but may also
lower the (already too low) savings even more. The second stage, devoted to an
optimal income tax financing a second-period pension, allowed us to identify
an additional determinant of optimal income tax, reflecting the fact that the
collective annuitization implicit in the pension scheme is more attractive with
a low average longevity than with a high average longevity. Finally, it was
shown that the optimal tax on health spending (size and sign) depends on the
covariance between the marginal utility of consumption and health spending
and, thus, on the complementarity (and the relative importance) of genes and
health spending as inputs in the survival process, as well as on the correlation
between genetic background and productivity.
35If e and ε are substitutable, cov
(
u′ (x) , e
)
> 0, and we have a positive or a negative tax on health.
36Clearly, if only e can enhance longevity, more productive agents do not spend less on health than
less productive agent, as there exists, under πε = 0, no way to ‘compensate’ low health spending
in longevity terms.
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In sum, our tax policy analysis reveals the crucial role played by deter-
minants that are usually absent in a setting with fixed longevities: the roles
of genes and health spending (and their interactions) in the production of
longevity and the correlation between genetic background and productivity.
Those determinants are generally absent in the optimal taxation literature,
but this paper shows that if one wants to characterize the optimal taxation
policy in a society with large longevity differentials (as shown on Fig. 1),
which depend on both genes and health spending, one can hardly ignore those
determinants. However, given the imperfect knowledge of those crucial pieces
of information, it cannot be overemphasized here that this study gives us only
a—purely theoretical—clue regarding the design of the optimal taxation policy
in the environment under study.
Moreover, even on the theoretical side, this study suffers from several
weaknesses, which invite further research and, at least, much caution. First,
on the ethical side, this study relied on the standard utilitarian approach,
which should only be regarded as a first approximation in the context of
endogenous longevity, as this does not allow us to do justice to intuitions
about individual responsibility or about a life period “not worth being lived”.
Second, when considering the second-best problem, we assumed that all agents
are equally myopic, which is a strong assumption, as we may expect more
productive agents to be also more informed on the survival function. Third,
this study focused on a static economy with a fixed heterogeneity, whereas the
heterogeneity of the population is likely to evolve over time. Given that the
social planner would like to internalize the “composition effects” of agents’
decisions on the composition of future cohorts, the optimal long-run policy
may depend on the dynamics of transmission of genes and productivities and
might thus differ from the optimal policy under a fixed partition.
Those few remarks suffice to show that much work remains to be done, in
the future, to have a better idea of the optimal fiscal policy in an economy
where longevity is influenced by factors on which agents have some control
and by factors on which they have no control at all.
To conclude, one might find shocking the likely conclusion that health
spendings should be taxed and not subsidized. This is at odds with the usual
recommendation that health care should be subsidized for various reasons:
redistribution, paternalism, externalities, etc. Nonetheless, this result can be
explained by the fact that here, most redistribution is implemented by the
income taxation. Moreover, it should be kept in mind that health expenditures
are, in our model, pure longevity-enhancing spendings, which affect welfare
only through increasing the length of life, while leaving the quality of each
period lived and productivity unchanged. Undoubtedly, this restriction leaves
aside various motives for subsidizing health care.
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